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I.
INTRODUCTION

Aris's own employees testified without contradiction or dispute that Aris ceased all
business operations on January 4, 2002, fired all of its employees, closed its doors and
then on January 7, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent
contractor doctors to run their own business on the Premises. Aris never again sought to
occupy the Premises and, of course, had no reason to do so. Aris simply wanted to
remove its equipment from the Premises. In fact, when Aris's Richard Enright
("Enright") came to Salt Lake City on January 22, 2002 to remove Aris's personal
property, the Doctors were still operating their business on the Premises and continued to
do so for a few weeks thereafter. Aris never contended that it suffered damages because
of its inability to occupy the Premises and no such damages were awarded. Instead, the
only damages sought and awarded were for depreciation of the personal property,
physical damage to the personal property and missing personal property. It is respectfully
submitted that the court of appeals erred in affirming the award of treble damages for this
personal property damage.
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II.
ARGUMENT

A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND
PROPERLY PRESERVED BELOW THEIR ARGUMENT CONCERNING
VACATING OF THE PREMISES.
Aris repeats in its brief the unsuccessful arguments it made to the court of appeals
that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence and to preserve below their
argument concerning Aris's vacating of the Premises.1 The record, however,
demonstrates that Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the evidence and did preserve
their argument below.

1. Wasatch and JDJ Marshaled the Evidence.
As it did before the court of appeals, Aris incorrectly argues that Wasatch and JDJ
have failed to marshal the evidence. Aris wholly fails, however, to recite a single piece of
evidence that was supposedly not marshaled or dispute with citations to the record any of
the evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief. This failure is not surprising because all of the
evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses

1

Ironically, as discussed later in this brief [pp. 8-10], Aris also raises for the very first
time an argument not raised before the court of appeals, i.e., that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise
before the court of appeals or the trial court their contention that treble damages cannot be

aiMardM&rdamM^tn nersnnal nrnneil^
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upon which Aris relied at trial or upon the stipulation of facts executed by the parties.
[See R. 210-216] Indeed, all of the facts which Aris sets forth in its brief are contained in
Petitioners' Brief, but are stated in Petitioner's Brief in even more detail most favorably
to Aris.
For example, Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to
January 22, 2002. Aris has been unable, however, to point to one piece of evidence not
contained in Petitioners' Brief. As stated above, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and his
boss, Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), testified without contradiction that Aris ceased all business
operations and terminated all its employees on January 4, did not pay rent and then turned
over possession to the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on
January 7. [R. 526 at 38-39; 527 at 234-237] Enright further testified that when he came
to Salt Lake City on January 22, he wanted to remove the equipment from the Premises.
[R. 526 at 41-43] Aris did not demand that the Doctors who were then in possession of
the Premises vacate the Premises and Aris made no effort to reoccupy the Premises. Soto
likewise testified that she told Wasatch's Dennis Peacock ("Peacock") that Aris was
entitled to remove its equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 246-248]
The failure to marshal argument raised by Aris is bereft of merit and should be
rejected.

3
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2. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved Below Their Argument That Aris Vacated on
January 4, 2002.
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ failed to preserve at trial the argument that Aris
vacated on January 4, 2002 and then misleadingly cites two alternative arguments raised
by Wasatch and JDJ below with respect to vacating of the Premises. Once again, this
argument is not faithful to the record. Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued before the trial
court that Aris either vacated the Premises on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the
Doctors vacated. For example:
(a) Wasatch and JDJ contended in the Pretrial Order that Aris unilaterally
terminated the Lease on January 4 and had vacated the Premises more than five days prior
to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the forcible detainer
occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176]
(b) Wasatch and JDJ argued in their Trial Brief that Aris shut down its office and
terminated all of its employees on January 4, allowed the Doctors to take possession of
the Premises and failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219] Wasatch and JDJ argued that
Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the Doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of
the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had terminated all its employees on
January 4, Aris was not in possession after that date. [R. 239-231]
(c) In their closing arguments at trial, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that Aris
vacated the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its offices:

4
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"The evidence at trial revealed that January 4, 2002 was the last day Aris was in
peaceable possession of the premises . . . . Aris was not in peaceable possession on that
date [January 22, 2002] - the terminated doctors were in possession at that time." [R. 305]
[See also R. 529 at 558-559 & 577]
Indeed, in his opening statement, Aris's own counsel told Judge Lewis that Aris
shut down its business on the Premises on January 4, 2002 and that thereafter the
independent contractor Doctors conducted their own business on the Premises. [R. 526 at
19-20]2 Beyond that, the Statement of Stipulated Facts executed by the parties prior to
trial indicates the same thing. [R. 212-213,1fl|l7-20]
In fact, the uncontradicted testimony of Arises own witnesses at trial was that when
Enright attempted to remove the equipment on January 22, Wasatch's Peacock refused on
the basis that Aris had abandoned the Premises. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No.
27]
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ raised at trial their argument that Aris vacated the
Premises on January 4.

2

If Aris is attempting to argue that Aris did not vacate because the Doctors' occupancy
constituted occupancy by Aris, this argument does not assist its case. If such a legally baseless
argument were accepted, Aris necessarily continued in occupancy of the Premises on January 22
when Enright attempted to remove the personal property because at that time the Doctors were
undeniably still in possession of the Premises using the equipment [see Finding of Fact No. 90].
Thus, there could not have been a forcible detainer of real estate on January 22 when Wasatch
and JDJ refused to consent to Enright's removing the personal property, as found by the trial
court and affirmed by the court of appeals.
5
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3. Whether Aris Vacated the Premises on January 4 Is Properly Before This
Court.
Aris narrowly construes this Court's order granting certiorari to preclude the
argument raised by Wasatch and JDJ that treble damages cannot be awarded because Aris
had already vacated the Premises weeks before Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to
remove its personal property. The Order states that the issue to be determined is:
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3)." The determination of that issue
obviously has to be made based upon the facts of this particular case. Wasatch and JDJ
have argued that treble damages cannot be awarded for damage to personal property in
any circumstance but that at the very least treble damages cannot be awarded for personal
property where, as in the present case, the tenant vacated the Premises weeks before the
tenant was not allowed to remove the personal property. This issue is properly before the
Court.

B. TREBLE DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE FORCIBLE DETAINER STATUTE.

1. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved This Argument Below.
Aris argues for the very first time that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise before the
court of appeals or the trial court the contention that treble damages under the forcible
6
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detainer statute cannot be awarded for damage to personal property. Aris made no such
argument before the court of appeals and this Court should, therefore, refuse to consider
the argument. See, Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f30, 16 P.3d 1233. Moreover, the
record disposes of this argument.
First, Wasatch and JDJ clearly raised this argument before the court of appeals
both in their opening brief and their reply brief. [See Appellants' Brief at 35-36;
Appellants' Reply Brief at 9, excerpts of which are attached hereto as Addenda A&B] For
example, Wasatch and JDJ argued in their opening brief before the court of appeals:
Aris did not seek restitution of the Premises at trial and no such relief was
granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on the basis it had not been
able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that Aris had no
use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises.
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute
is a drastic remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing
tenants of their possession of real property. The statute should be strictly
construed. [Citations omitted] A landlord's act in withholding a tenant's
personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining real property
a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute
simply does not apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of
personal property, especially after a tenant has vacated and abandoned the
premises. The imposition of the treble damages penalty would be even
more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated for months
in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability
to occupy the Premises. [Appellants' Brief at 35-36]
In addition, in Appellants' Reply Brief before the court of appeals, Wasatch and
JDJ argued:

7
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Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do so
by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible
detainer statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the
withholding of personal property. [Citations omitted]
Wasatch and JDJ then went on in their reply brief to distinguish the two cases that Aris
cited in its brief before the court of appeals to attempt to support the imposition of treble
damages. [Appellants' Reply Brief at 9]
Clearly, the treble damage issue was raised by Wasatch and JDJ before the court of
appeals.
Aris also raises for the first time its argument that the treble damage argument was
not preserved in the trial court. Even if Aris could raise this new argument, Wasatch and
JDJ clearly did preserve the treble damages issue before the trial court. [See, e.g., R. 401402,ffljcand e;R. 403,^5]
For example, in its objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment, Wasatch and JDJ argued that §78-36-10 only applied to the forcible
detainer of real property, not personal property. [R. 401, ^fc] They further argued that
"[s]ince the elements of the forcible detainer statute were not met the trebling of damages
is not appropriate

Only the damages set forth in §78-36-10(2)(a) are eligible for

trebling, which does not include personal property or equipment. [R. 401-402, ^e] [See

8
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also R. 403, *(j5; R. 304 (the facts of the case do not qualify as a forcible detainer action
and treble damages are not appropriate.)] 3
An issue is adequately preserved for appellate review if it is raised in time to give
the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App. 367,
117, 38 P.3d 307. In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987), the court
stated that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial court and
the trial court has had the opportunity to make findings of fact or law." In Peirce v.
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^16, 994 P.2d 193, this Court held that the appellant adequately
preserved issues in the trial court by raising them in a memorandum submitted to the trial
court before it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the case at bar,
Wasatch and JDJ plainly raise the issue of treble damages with respect to personal
property before the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the
issue was preserved for appeal.

3

In this connection, it should be noted that Aris's contention that it was entitled to
recover treble damages with respect to the personal property damage was not raised until late in
the game. In its Amended Complaint, Aris only claimed generally that it had "suffered damages,
and continues to suffer damages" as a result of the forcible detainer of the Premises and then
sought treble damages with respect to those unspecified damages. [R. 33,ffl[29& 30] Aris did
not allege personal property damage by virtue of the forcible detainer. The only personal
property damage alleged was in the Fourth Claim for Relief for conversion. [R. 34, ]fl|37 thru 39]
Aris did not seek treble damages with respect to the personal property damages alleged in its
conversion claim. Nor in its trial brief did Aris expressly contend that it was entitled to treble
damages for damage to personal property based on violation of the forcible detainer statute. [R.
199-200] Instead, Aris argued that it was entitled to recover the personal property damages based
upon its conversion claim and sought to recover punitive damages. [R. 201-202] It was not until
the last seconds of its counsel's closing argument that Aris claimed briefly in passing and without
discussion or citation of authority that it was entitled to either treble damages or punitive
damages with respect to the personal property damage. [R. 529 at 556]
9
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2. §78-36-10(2) and (3) Do Not Provide for Trebling of Personal Property
Damage.
Aris argues that under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(2),
damages to personal property are recoverable where the landlord has forcibly detained the
real estate and, therefore, such damages must be trebled under §78-36-10(3). To the
contrary, §78-36-10(2) says nothing about damage to personal property. That section
provides:
The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the Complaint and proved at trial.
Each of these subsections relates to real estate. There is no such thing as the forcible
detainer of personal property. A landlord's refusal to turn over possession of personal
property is a conversion and is a distinct act from the landlord's forcible detainer of the
real estate.
Section 78-36-10(3) only provides that: "The judgment shall be entered against the
defendant for the rent, [and] for three times the amount of damages assessed under
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c)

" As demonstrated in Petitioners' Brief [p. 20],

this treble damages penalty provision should be strictly construed. Because there is no
express provision in §78-36-10(2) for recovery of personal property damages, §78-36-

10
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10(3) should be strictly construed to prohibit treble damages for damages to personal
property.
Such a statutory interpretation would not, of course, leave a tenant without a
remedy where a landlord refuses to surrender possession of personal property. The tenant
can recover compensatory damages for conversion and can also recover punitive damages
in an appropriate case where the landlord has acted willfully and maliciously or in
knowing or reckless disregard of a tenant's rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-18-19. In the
case at bar, the trial court refused to award punitive damages because Wasatch and JDJ
did not act with a knowing or reckless indifference or disregard of Arises rights. [R. 369375] The trial court's refusal to award punitive damages is not surprising given the fact
that JDJ in good faith claimed it had a right to retain the personal property based upon
Aris's claimed abandonment of the Premises and the provisions of paragraph 20.1 of the
Lease [Ex. 9, ^20.1; R. 526 at 41-43; R. 413; Finding No. 26] and the further fact that the
parties were cooperating for months to attempt to lease the Premises and sell the personal
property to a third party. [R. 527 at 164-166 & 199; R. 528 at 470-471 & Ex. 24]

3. The Personal Property Damage Did Not Constitute Consequential
Damages or General Damages Resulting From the Forcible Detainer.
Judge Orme stated in his dissenting opinion that even if the personal property
damages could be viewed as consequential damages from the forcible detainer, the

11
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personal property damages could not be recovered because no general damages were
recovered for the forcible detainer. Aris's response is telling.
First, Aris argues that the personal property damages were not consequential
damages resulting from the forcible detainer and that Wasatch and JDJ never made such
an argument. [Aris Brief at 23-24] Wasatch and JDJ agree. Although Judge Orme was
correct that even if the personal property damages were viewed as consequential damages
they could not be recovered, the parties never argued the personal property damages were
consequential damages and they clearly were not. In other words, the personal property
damages were not suffered as a consequence of a forcible detainer of the real estate. The
personal property damages found by the trial court were suffered as a result of the refusal
by Wasatch and JDJ to surrender possession of the personal property to Aris, but, this fact
augers in favor of Wasatch and JDJ.4
Second, Aris argues that it suffered "harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason
of the injury" resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, that the personal
property damages were the natural and proximate cause of the forcible detainer found by

4

Furthermore, Aris has never argued that the personal property damage constituted
special damages resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises. Even had Aris made such a
contention, and even if the personal property damages were incorrectly deemed to be special
damages, Aris did not plead special damages in the forcible detainer cause of action of its
Amended Complaint. [R. 33] A party is required to specifically plead special damages in order to
recover them. See, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991); Graham v.
Street, 270 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah 1954).
12
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the trial court so that these damages constituted general damages and that is all Aris was
required to prove.
This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between detainer of the real estate
and the separate act of refusing to permit removal of the personal property. As Judge
Orme stated in his dissenting opinion, "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing
policy favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and
landlord just because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation."
[Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326,
f36, 121 P.3d 24] The natural and proximate result of a landlord's forcible detainer of
real estate is the tenant's loss of occupancy of the real estate. It was not the detainer of
the real estate that caused the damages awarded Aris. It was the separate act of refusing
to turn over the personal property. As stated earlier, Aris suffered no damage because of
any loss of occupancy of the real estate.
Aris argues in this regard that Judge Orme was wrong in stating that the general
damages recoverable by a tenant for forcible detainer of real estate consist of the
reasonable rental value of the Premises during the time they were forcibly detained.
Without any authority, Aris argues that reasonable rental value is not the measure of
damages because a tenant is not entitled to recover rent from the landlord. However, if a
tenant is entitled to possession of real estate, the general measure of damages that a tenant
suffers by being deprived of possession is the value of the possession. In turn, the value

13
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of the possession of leased premises would (absent proof otherwise) presumably be the
reasonable rental value of the real estate. That amount is what it would cost the tenant to
lease other comparable space? In any event, the general damages recoverable for forcible
detainer of real estate would not be damage to personal property.

4. There Are No Utah Cases Holding That Treble Damages Can Be
Recovered For Conversion of Personal Property.
Aris incorrectly argues that Utah case law supports its position that treble damages
under the forcible detainer statute can be awarded for conversion of personal property.
[Aris Brief at 18-20] The cases cited by Aris do not in fact support this position.
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965). These cases are not on point because
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord not only
refused to allow the tenant to occupy the premises, but at the same time refused to permit
the tenant to remove personal property. This Court simply recognized that the tenants had
causes of action for conversion of the personal property. The Court did not hold or imply

5

Aris challenges Judge Orme's reliance upon Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930)
for his general damage analysis on the basis that it was an unlawful detainer case and argues that
Wasatch and JDJ fail to address the Forrester court's language that "'[t]he plaintiff is entitled to
recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer."
Aris's distinction is one without a difference. And, once again, the natural and proximate cause
of an unlawful detainer or a forcible detainer of real estate is not damage to personal property.
14
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in either case that treble damages can be awarded against a landlord for conversion of the
tenant's personal property.
Aris cites for the first time King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1955). King does
not assist Aris. In King, the landlords padlocked the premises and refused to allow the
tenant to enter to remove its personal property after the tenant had failed to pay rent. The
tenant sued for wrongful eviction and for conversion of its personal property. The Court
held that the tenant had failed to prove any damages resulting from the landlords' forcible
entry onto the Premises. No treble damages were awarded and no issue of treble damages
was discussed. In fact, the tenant sought to separately recover on his conversion claim
damages for the landlords' refusal to turn over the tenant's personal property. The Court
separately discussed this issue and held that the landlords had a lien on the personal
property for unpaid rent and therefore had not converted the personal property. Further,
there was no conversion because there was no evidence that the landlords used the
personal property for their own purposes.
Similarly, Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944), relied upon by Aris, is
unhelpful. That case did not involve any damage to personal property. While the tenant
was away from the premises in the middle of the winter, the landlord removed all of the
doors. The tenant continued in possession. The Court only concluded that the landlord
had a legal duty not to enter the premises by force, that the landlord had violated that duty
and the tenant had suffered damages. The majority opinion did not even discuss the type
or amount of damages involved. The Court only held the trial court had not erred in
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awarding damages for mental anguish and humiliation without assessing other nominal or
compensatory damages. There was no discussion as to whether these damages were
special damages, consequential damages or general damages.
Lastly, Aris places great reliance upon Fowler v. Setter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App.
1992), decided by a panel of the court of appeals of which Judge Orme was a member.
Aris argues that in Fowler the court of appeals "upheld an award of treble damages for
loss of and damage to personal property under the forcible detainer statute." Aris unfairly
and inaccurately criticizes Jude Orme's opinion in the case at bar as being inconsistent
with his decision in Fowler. [Aris Brief at 19-20]
Aris overstates the holding in Fowler. In Fowler, the owners of a self-storage
facility broke the lock on the tenant's unit and removed and sold the tenant's personal
property. The single defendant at trial admitted liability and the jury awarded damages of
$7,000. There is no discussion in the opinion of the basis for the $7,000 award and the
award of compensatory damages was not an issue on appeal. After entry of the verdict,
the plaintiffs moved for an award of treble damages pursuant to the forcible entry and
detainer statute. The only objection raised by the landlord was that the tenant had failed
to endorse the summons pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-8 and that failure allegedly
barred an award of treble damages. The only issue on appeal was whether the failure to
endorse the summons barred an award of treble damages. 6 838 P.2d at 677. There was

6

The court of appeals did not even decide the general question of whether the forcible
entry statute applied to an uninhabited storage facility because that issue was not before the court.
[838P.2dat677n.3]
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no issue before the court of appeals as to whether treble damages could be awarded for
damage to personal property (even assuming that the $7,000 verdict was based upon
personal property damages) and the court of appeals did not decide such an issue.
Consequently, Aris's criticism of Judge Orme's opinion in the present case as being
inconsistent with his opinion in Fowler is baseless. Simply put, Fowler did not consider
or decide the issue now before this Court. No Utah case has decided this issue.

C. EVEN IF TREBLE DAMAGES COULD OTHERWISE BE AWARDED
FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A
FORCIBLE DETAINER, TREBLE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
WHERE THE TENANT HAS ALREADY VACATED THE PREMISES.
Even if, contrary to what Wasatch and JDJ argue above and in their opening brief,
this Court concludes for some reason that when a landlord forcibly detains real estate and
then refuses to turn over possession of the tenant's personal property that the personal
property damage can be trebled, treble damages should not have been awarded in this
case.
As previously explained, the undisputed evidence from Aris's own employees - as recited by Aris's counsel in his opening statement and as acknowledged in the
stipulated facts - - was that Aris went out of business, terminated its employees and shut
its doors on January 4, 2002 and then turned over possession of the Premises to the
Doctors to operate their own business on January 7, 2002. Although Aris argues it did
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not vacate the Premises at that time, it does not challenge this undisputed evidence or
recite any evidence to support the notion that it continued in possession of the Premises.
Aris had no use for the Premises, never attempted to reoccupy the Premises and had no
ability to do so since it had fired all of its employees.
After Aris went out of business on January 4, at most all the evidence
demonstrated was that commencing 18 days later, on January 22, Aris wanted to remove
its equipment. Because Aris did not want to occupy, and could not use, the Premises,
Aris did not suffer any damages because it did not continue to occupy the real estate; Aris
did not seek any occupancy damages and Aris was not awarded any such damages.
Under these circumstances, Aris was not entitled to an award of treble damages for the
conversion of its personal property found by the trial court which occurred weeks after
Aris had vacated the Premises.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages.
DATED this

of February, 2006.

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Premises at trial and no such relief was granted. Aris did not even, M vi im\ damages on
(lit h.isi.s it had not been able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that
Air. li.nl MM use Im Hie hrmi'.i.1, Ans only sought damages i! claimed to have suffered
because it had not been permitted to take IJ,;. LHUii>illHi« In-HI. the I "remises.
The treble damages penalty pro\ ided b) ili^ tbrciblc dctainei btaiui
iitrnicd I, in discourage landlords from fbrciblv dispossessing fcnanis o1 iheir possession of
real properly.
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468, 470 (Utah 1964). Cf. Keller v. SouthwoodNorth
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^ I Ttah 1998) (fon ible entry statute only applies to types of prop* »^ *vnr>lc c;t?
< . i; .

v< ,. ,

in vviUuioiding v \

. . , ..„

,./r.«. 615P.2d040, 951 fNe\

|-

--

IWr-

, landlord's a>.:
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. . ;. ,s iDl> detaining

the Equipment on January 22, Wasatch and JDJ also forcibly detail led the Eqi lipi i lei it
when Peacock changed the locks after tl ic Doctors vacated on Febiuai) >. llowcvci,
\n\ (MI) lnii}> brum < nliiiiiai ih vacated and abai idoned the Premises and wn»n.
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\\ he" Hit I

-.
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hanged on
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35]
2. Wrongful Eviction,
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L Forcible Detainer.
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the
doctors on January 7, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no
ability to do so. Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do
so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal
property.4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969).
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31] These cases are not on point because
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property.
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property.

4

Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402fflfa,c & e;
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 p]
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